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Fighting the Financial crisis in greece:
the Privileged comPany to Protect Production and trade
in currants (1905) as international bank cooPeration
Korinna Schönhärl
abstract: The global economic crisis in the 1890s affected the economy of greece 
severely, and in 1893 the greek state had to stop servicing its foreign debt. Part of the 
problem was the lack of diversity of greek agricultural production, which was focused on 
raisins and currants (especially flavourful raisins, grown exclusively in the area around 
corinth) for export. The collapse of market prices for this good seriously affected the 
greek treasury and society in the growing regions. The greek government responded by 
trying to withhold part of the harvest in fertile years to stabilise world market prices. Plans 
to organise a monopoly company for the currant trade necessitated high sums of capital 
from abroad. This article investigates the question of how foreign bankers in london 
(hambro & son, emile erlanger) and Paris (banque de l’union Parisienne) could be 
convinced to participate in the project. Which factors allowed foreign bankers to trust in 
the greek national economy despite its poor reputation? What factors influenced their 
risk management? The focus is on the role of greek brokers in persuading the foreigners 
to invest in greece, especially the role played by ioannis Pesmazoglou, the director of the 
young and innovative bank of athens. 
Trust in the Banking Business in Times of Crisis
banks are institutions which deal in promises to pay in the future – this is the 
main characteristic of their business.1 because the future cannot be forecast, 
this is of course a risky affair. The contingency of the decisions which have to 
be taken would block banking business completely if the banks did not have 
strategies to deal with risk. risk awareness and risk management are thus 
the most important competences that banks need to establish and cultivate 
within their organisations. certain criteria must be developed to enable trust 
in partners and projects in the absence of absolute security, which can in any 
case never be attained.2 how can trust be generated in banking practices? 
1 dirk baecker, Womit handeln Banken? Eine Untersuchung zur Risikoverarbeitung 
in der Wirtschaft, nachdruck, suhrkamp-taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 946, Frankfurt am 
main: suhrkamp, 2008, pp. 13 ff. 
2 Ibid., pp. 140 ff. 
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The question of the generation of trust is perhaps one of the oldest in 
sociology. classic authors such as Ferdinand tönnies3 or max Weber4 discuss 
it in their works. georg simmel’s book about the trust basis of money is 
essential reading for the examination of business history.5 in modern times, 
Francis Fukuyama defined the level of trust in a society as the basis of its 
economic welfare, because trustful cooperation reduces transaction costs in 
all fields of business. he defined families, neighbourhoods, ethnic or religious 
communities or clubs as sources of these sociocultural resources.6 on the 
other hand, new institutional economics sees institutions as the source of 
the trust of market actors. Finally, economic historians such as hartmut 
berghoff are interested in the private economic methods of the generation of 
trust.7 berghoff pointed to banking history as a field where the construction 
of trust should be researched in detail. 
economic crises are situations in which trust is deeply damaged. The 
subsequent recovery of trust is often an arduous business. These situations 
are very well suited to research into the mechanisms of the generation of 
trust. in the case of a state’s bankruptcy, such as that of greece in 1893, trust 
in the state as borrower was damaged, but so also was trust in the banks and 
the economy as a whole. one reason for the greek moratorium on payments 
to foreign creditors was the sudden decline in the price of currants on the 
world market after 1892. While the credit of the greek state gradually revived 
after an international Financial commission was set up in 1898, the currant 
question remained virulent. This not only led to turbulence and riots in the 
greek growing regions, but also to serious unrest in the international export 
markets. it was 1905 before a “Privileged company to Protect Production 
and trade in currants” was established in greece to organise the currant 
trade in a new way and to minimise the risks for the greek treasury. This 
3 Ferdinand tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Abhandlung des Communismus 
und des Socia-lismus als empirischer Culturformen, leipzig 1887.
4 max Weber, Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, Part iii: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 
tübingen 1922.
5 georg simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, leipzig: duncker & humblot, 1900.
6 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, london: 
Penguin, 1996. 
7 hartmut berghoff, “vertrauen als ökonomische schlüsselvaribale. Zur Theorie 
des vertrauens und der geschichte seiner privatwirtschaftlichen Produktion”, in karl-
Peter ellerbrock (ed.), Die Wirtschafts-geschichte vor der Herausforderung durch die New 
Institutional Economics, untersuchungen zur Wirtschafts-, sozial- und technikgeschichte, 
24, münster: ardey-verl, 2004, pp. 58-71, 64-71. 
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company was founded as a joint-stock company with huge sums of capital 
from abroad. With respect to the generation of trust in the banking business, 
the question arises as to why French and british capitalists were willing to 
trust in this project despite the quite unstable economic situation of greece. 
research into this question may contribute towards consideration of the 
criteria on which trust in the banking business is founded. 
Currants and Raisins in the Greek Economy in the Nineteenth Century 
The importance of currants and raisins for the greek economy in the 
nineteenth century has been intensively researched by greek economic 
historians.8 during the nineteenth century currants and raisins were one 
of the most important of greece’s exports. statistics show that production 
actually expanded in the 1870s and 1880s. in the period between 1887 and 1893 
the value of these exported dried fruits exceeded that of all other export goods 
significantly.9 The expansion of exports was possible due to the rising demand 
for currants and raisins in europe caused by other countries’ vineyards 
being affected by mildew. however, when in 1891 France, which was most 
severely affected, established tariffs on imported currants and raisins in 
order to protect its own recovered grape production, the price for currants 
and raisins fell to a sixth of its former international level. The situation was 
further worsened through the worldwide economic barings bank crisis at the 
beginning of the 1890s. greece was not able to sufficiently compensate for the 
decline in demand for its extended production.10 For the greek treasury this 
8 see Petros Pizanias, Οικονομική ιστορία της ελληνικής σταφίδας, 1851-1912. Παραγωγή, 
διεθνής αγορά, διαμόρφωση τιμών, κρίση [economic history of the greek raisin, 1851-
1912: production, international market, price development, crisis], athens 1988; Theano 
tsiovaridou, “la répercussion en grèce à la fin du XiXe siècle de la crise du raisin sec”, Balkan 
Studies 21 (1980), pp. 128-145. The raisin problem is also mentioned in every economic 
history of greece; see, for example, georgios christopoulos, Ιστορία του ελληνικού Έθνους. 
vol. Xiv: Νεώτερος ελληνισμός από το 1881 ως το 1913 [history of the greek state, vol. Xiv: 
modern greek history from 1881 to 1913], athens 1970, pp. 65-68; christina agriantoni, Oι 
aπαρχές της εκβιομηχάνισης στην ελλάδα τόν 19ο αι. [The beginning of industrialisation in 
greece in the nineteenth century], athens 1986, pp. 293-300. 
9 alexis Frangiadis, “Αγροτική οικονομία και εξωτερικό εμπόριο [rural economy and 
external trade]”, in kostas kostis and socrates Petmezas (eds), Η ανάπτυξη της ελληνικής 
οικονομίας κατά τον 19ο αιώνα (1830-1914) [The development of the greek economy in 
the nineteenth century (1830-1914)], athens 2006, pp. 153-174, esp. p. 160. 
10 elena Frangakis-syrett, “monoculture in nineteenth-century greece and the Port 
city of Patras”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 20/2 (1994), pp. 12 ff. 
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meant a disastrous decline in revenues, which made further servicing of the 
country’s foreign debt impossible. between 1878 and 1893 greece had issued 
730 million francs, an extraordinarily large sum for the hardly industrialised 
country with a yearly budget of about 80 million francs. a huge proportion 
of this money had been invested not in the development of the national 
economy, but in the armed conflict between greece and the ottoman empire. 
in december 1893 the greek prime minister, harilaos trikoupis, announced 
that the greek state was insolvent.11 
older historiography usually saw the raisin monoculture and the above-
mentioned raisin crisis as the principal reason for the backwardness of greek 
agriculture and the economy in the nineteenth century. however, recent 
research has changed the perspective and understands the currant culture 
rather as presenting an opportunity for the young greek economy to move 
towards the industrial era, as it provided productive challenges not only for 
particular regions but also for the greek economy as a whole.12 in any case, the 
currant question was essential for greek economic welfare. in the disastrous 
situation of 1893 it was obvious that the production and commercialisation of 
greek currants and raisins had to be protected from possible crisis. a way had 
to be found to deal with the surplus of about 60 million venetian pounds13 
per annum so as to consolidate international prices for the dried fruits. The 
problem was rendered even more urgent by social riots in the currant trade 
areas in 1895. The growers fought for better prices and strongly believed that 
a monopoly was the only possible solution. “monopoly or death” was their 
dramatic motto.14
in the same year the greek parliament issued an initial law which forced the 
storage of 15% of the crop to reduce supplies and increase prices. after greece 
was put under international financial control in 1898, a so-called currant bank 
(stafidiki trapeza) was founded in 1899 to centralise the storage and to stabilise 
the market prices. The shareholders of the bank were all producers who were 
obliged to store a proportion of their crop. The bank worked with capital 
from the government,15 but the very rich crop of 1903 led to its collapse since 
its capital was not sufficient to buy the large surplus.16 The government was 
11 g. v. dertilis, Ιστορία του Νεοελληνικού Κράτους, 1830-1920 [history of the greek 
state, 1830-1920], athens: estia, 2010, pp. 603 ff. 
12 Frangiadis, “Αγροτική οικονoμία”, p. 153 f. 
13 1 venetian pound (the common unit for weighing raisins and currants) correlates 
to 1.06 british pounds.
14 konstantinos a. vovolinis and spiros a. vovolinos, Μέγα ελληνικόν βιογραφικόν 
λεξικόν [large greek biographical dictionary], athens 1958-1963, vol. v, pp. 331, 337.
15 Pizanias, Οικονομική ιστορία, p. 25; Frangiadis, “Αγροτική οικονoμία”, p. 166. 
16 Pizanias, Οικονομική ιστορία, p. 26. 
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forced to act. in anarchistic unrest furious farmers in Pylos again demanded the 
introduction of a currant trade monopoly to stabilise their profits, and even set 
fire to the local branch of the national bank of greece.17 The idea was to install 
a monopoly for the currant trade with participation of foreign capital. 
The london bankers brotherton and backhouse18 wanted to give a huge 
share of the one million drachmas of capital planned for the proposed 
syndicate. hambro & son and the national bank of greece also wanted to 
participate,19 and even rothschild seemed to be interested.20 brotherton and 
backhouse revealed their motives vis-à-vis the national bank of greece: 
if it be decided to adopt the scheme, and the syndicate be finally 
formed, the banks ought to help the scheme onto a successful issue; 
and, having regard to your and our shareholders’ interests, we 
have every confidence that you will not be guided by the impulse 
of the government alone, or by purely platonic motives; but will 
satisfy yourself that the terms of the convention are of a workable 
character; and that those of the syndicate are such as ultimately, if not 
immediately, to produce a reasonable profit to those who stake their 
money on the success of the scheme.21 
They supported the scheme although the idea of a monopoly was far divorced 
from the liberal neoclassical approach. nevertheless, it was a step that, in the 
view of the bankers, seemed necessary not only for greece but also for the 
british empire, which was to benefit, 
[…] by establishing a preferential tariff for its colonies, and a tax on 
food, with a view to the extension of their prosperity by counteracting 
the effect of those gigantic trusts and syndicates of foreign nations; 
and at the same time of binding the empire together, and of making 
its own production self-sufficing.22 
17 Ibid., p. 25. 
18 edward allen brotherton and robert solomon backhouse (managing director and 
attorney of the concessions and monopolies ltd).
19 The convention of the planned company was printed in the newspaper The Grocer 
(6 June 1903), as a translation from Νέο Άστυ (9-23 may 1903). one half of the capital 
was planned to be collected through the public offer of the shares of the company at the 
stock exchange. For the negotiations between brotherton, backhouse and the national 
bank of greece, see the archives of the national bank of greece, athens (hereafter ete), 
a1s28y2 ´F10. 
20 brotherton and backhouse to streit [governor of the national bank of greece] (26 
may 1903), ete, a1s28y2 ´F10. 
21 brotherton and backhouse to streit (15 June 1903), ete, a1s28y2 ´F10. 
22 Ibid. 
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The timing for the project did indeed seem very opportune. in 1903 the 
rate of exchange between the drachma and the franc, which had been at the 
disastrous level of 1.65: 1 in 1898, started to recover. by september 1903 it had 
already improved to 1.54, with a strong falling tendency.23 This was of great 
advantage to the holders of old greek securities and caused a boom in these 
bonds in Paris and london in the following years. For a banker with good 
intuition, it was an inviting moment to issue greek securities. 
however, this first attempt to create a company with a monopoly on the 
currant trade in greece with the participation of british capitalists failed. 
The main reason for this was the intervention of british merchants working 
to halt the project. british currant traders,24 the british dried Fruit trade 
association and the british chamber of commerce protested to the Foreign 
office in london to stop the monopoly project, because they were concerned 
about free trade in currants and raisins and their own profits.25 They argued 
that a monopoly would increase the price of a product consumed especially by 
the british working class.26 The british board of trade used the opportunity 
to point out that the commercial treaty of 1890 between greece and great 
britain was in any case much more useful to greece than to the united 
kingdom, so that no further concessions were possible at all.27 The greek 
23 “Finances helléniques”, in L’Économiste Européen (25 september 1903).
24 For example, george Wood to the marquess of landsdowne, secretary of state 
of Foreign affairs (23 march 1903), in the british national archives (hereafter na), Fo 
32/768. Wood explained that it was the nephew of the greek prime minister, Theodoros 
deligiannis, who tried to usurp the monopoly. The greek state would get only £100,000 
per year from the monopoly, a very low sum. on the other hand, the monopoly would 
ruin the traditional british currant trade houses, including, for example, the one owned by 
Wood’s family. his great uncle samuel barff had started in the currant trade in Zakynthos 
(Zante) in 1816, and now his brother F. b. Wood continued it in Patras, as consul-general 
of great britain. Wood asked for the help of the Foreign ministry against the monopoly 
plans. The consul-general F. b. Wood himself added that the monopoly would restrict 
earnings to a small group. he saw diversification of agricultural production as the only 
possible measure for the greek growers (Wood to landsdowne, [6 april 1903], na, Fo 
32/768). indeed, dimitrios ioannis deligiannis was to be managing director and attorney 
of the planned company; see the translation of the articles of a convention to promote a 
company for the monopoly of currants, in the ionian bank archives (hereafter ib), 1/15. 
25 london dried Fruit trade association to the Foreign office (17 april 1903), na, 
Fo 32/768; secretary of the london chamber of commerce to british Foreign ministry (3 
april 1903), na, Fo 32/768. 
26 london dried Fruit trade association to the Foreign office (17 april 1903), na, 
Fo 32/768. 
27 board of trade to the Foreign office (29 may 1903), na, Fo 32/768. on the other 
hand hawey, as the british member of the international Financial commission in athens, 
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prime minister responded by saying that only the earnings of the middlemen 
should be lowered with no increase in prices for the british consumer, but this 
was of little help.28 Through the protests of the merchants and the board of 
trade, the british Foreign office was driven to intervene in athens, pointing 
out that the planned monopoly company would not be compatible with the 
greek-british commercial treaty.29 The other ambassadors did not welcome 
the idea of a monopoly either, and the netherlands, england, germany 
and italy protested.30 due to the international opposition to the project, the 
greek parliament discussed the proposed convention for the company but 
had strong reservations. The parliamentarians changed several points of the 
convention, stipulating, for example, that the bankers should deposit a huge 
amount as a guarantee in advance.31 This demand shows the low level of 
trust between the intended contract partners. accordingly, brotherton and 
backhouse did not accept the modifications to the convention, which had 
been instigated without their sanction. indeed, they were so shocked that they 
withdrew their involvement.32 Their patience or perhaps daringness seemed 
exhausted by the emerging difficulties. backhouse insisted that he could not 
relinquish his claims, which were “a sine qua non from a strong sense of duty, 
not only to our friends on this side, but also to your excellency and the greek 
government”. he pointed out that no capitalists could be found “to put their 
money into it [the company], unless the blemishes we take exception to in 
the convention are removed”. The bankers argued that it was a question 
of responsibility between confidential partners not to accept a “convention 
containing terms or conditions that in our opinion predoomed it to certain 
recommended the proposal because he did not see any alternatives in the long run (hawey 
to lansdowne [9 June 1903], na, Fo 32/768). 
28 british ambassador edwin h. egerton to landsdowne (10 april 1903), na, Fo 
32/768. however, the ambassador saw great difficulties in the practical implementation 
of the monopoly. 
29 see the correspondence between ambassador egerton and the minister of Foreign 
affairs lansdowne in na, Fo 32/768. even the storage of 15-20% of the currant crop 
was interpreted as violating the trade convention between greece and great britain; see 
london chamber of commerce to lansdowne (3 april 1903), na, Fo 32/768. 
30 egerton to lansdowne (9 June 1903); egerton to greek Foreign minister skouses 
(24 June 1903), na, Fo 32/768. egerton threatened the dissolution of the trade convention 
of 1890. 
31 “amendments required by messrs. brotherton and backhouse. submitted to 
the board at their meeting of June 22th 1903. messrs. brotherton and backhouse being 
absent”, ete, a1s28y2 ´F10.  
32 egerton to lansdowne (2 July 1903), na, Fo 32/768. 
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failure”.33 in this situation, Prime minister Theodoros deligiannis had to put 
off the passing of the necessary law in parliament, explicitly because of the 
foreign opposition to the project.34 instead, he forced the national bank, the 
ionian bank and the bank of athens to credit 6.5 million drachmas to the 
currant bank to enable it to buy that year’s crop, so as to stop the disturbances 
of the growers in the Peloponnese.35 
it became clear that before a solution for the greek currant question 
could be found, a compromise had to be reached on the international level. 
long proceedings between the greek government and the governments of 
the great Powers followed. in the british case, the london branch of the 
british-greek ionian bank was active as an intermediary.36 great britain was 
very interested in finding a solution, because, since 1898, the ambassadors 
had been simply overwhelmed by the speed of the regeneration of greek 
trade and economic activity.37 The new market looked very appealing for 
british merchants and investors, and there was a concern to secure the 
best conditions for british industries and trade to participate in the new 
opportunities. so, the british board of trade was willing to give the greeks 
a free hand in solving the currant question, if in turn the customs on british 
imports to greece were reduced.38 The greeks accepted the reduction of 
customs charges on some british goods, but not on all of them. especially for 
textile products this was not possible, and the proceedings continued, as the 
greek Foreign minister romanos pointed out: 
to withdraw the protection of existing duties from that industry at 
the present moment would be to kill it at once, and thereby not only 
to throw a very large number of people out of employment, but to 
create much bitterness of feeling between the cotton and the currant 
industries, the latter of which the government would be attacked for 
protecting at the expense of the former.39 
in 1904, the greek government tried to stabilise the currant trade through 
a reform bill,40 but without success. a more general solution had to be found, 
33 backhouse to streit (25 June 1903), ete, a1s28y2 ´F10.
34 egerton to lansdowne (16 July 1903), na, Fo 32/768. 
35 ionian bank to the national bank of greece, ete, a1s28y2 ´F8. 
36 Falconer larkworthy (ionian bank) to lansdowne (16 July 1903), na, Fo 32/768.
37 For example, international Financial commission, british delegate corbett to 
Foreign minister landsdowne (7 July 1901), na, Fo 32/742.
38 lansdowne to british ambassador sir Francis elliot (21 July 1904), na, Fo 32/769. 
39 elliot to lansdowne (30 august 1904), na, Fo 32/769. 
40 currant reform bill, as passed by the greek parliament on 17-30 June 1904, translation 
(14 July 1904), ib, 1/15. 
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but in spring 1905 the british ambassador was still struggling with the greek 
government about the reduction of duties on british products. even the duties 
on greek sweets such as halva and loukoumi were discussed.41 after drawn-
out wheeling and dealing, greece gave its agreement to the reduction of duties 
on several british products, for example cod and stockfish, confectionary, 
biscuits and some cotton and jute products. The forecast loss for the greek 
treasury was estimated at 247,000 drachmas per year, but, on the other hand, 
the united kingdom had pledged itself not to raise the import duties on 
currants for the next five years.42 Thereafter the british ambassador at athens 
suggested that the british government would not further intervene in a new 
arrangement of the greek currant trade.43 in november 1904 a new british-
greek declaration was signed, followed by the new trade convention, which 
came into effect in July 1905. it was high time for this agreement: due to the 
very rich crop, the currant bank finally went bankrupt in summer 1905.44 
in this situation, a new initiative came not from the national bank or the 
ionian bank, but from the very recently founded bank of athens (ba). its 
executive officer, ioannis Pesmazoglou, presented a new plan for an international 
Privileged company to Protect Production and trade in currants. he tried to 
find a solution in cooperation with the london- and Paris-based banking houses 
hambro & son and erlanger and the Paris-based banque de l’union Parisienne 
(buP). of course, on the one hand, this group of capitalists counted on the 
absorption of the profits of the greek currant trade;45 but, on the other hand, the 
huge investment in the unstable greek market seemed to be extremely risky, and 
some observers doubted the chances of profit for the investors. indeed, profits 
in the early years were not overwhelming. so the question arises as to how the 
bankers charged the risk of the business and what kind of risk management took 
place between the partners. to answer this question, i will first introduce the 
principal actors and their personal relationships before presenting the idea of 
the project and the way it was discussed in the business correspondence. 
41 elliot to lansdowne, letters of spring 1905, na, Fo 32/770. 
42 elliot to lansdowne (8 July 1905), na, Fo 32/770.
43 an especially difficult sub-question was the reduction of greek customs duties for 
products from newfoundland (stockfish as the most important), which was willing to 
abolish customs on greek currants; see several letters in na, Fo 32/768. 
44 see socrate d. Petmezas, “l’économie agricole grecque face à la grande crise de la 
première globalisation”, herein, p. 104. 
45 Id., “Αγροτική οικονομία” [rural economy], in kostis and Petmezas (eds), Η ανά-
πτυξη της ελληνικής οικονομίας κατά τον 19ο αιώνα (1830-1914), pp. 103-152, esp. p. 139 f.
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The Actors and their Networks 
1. ioannis Pesmazoglou and the bank of athens
The man who pulled the strings in this project was ioannis Pesmazoglou, 
executive officer of the ba.46 The Pesmazoglou family originated from asia 
minor. ioannis’ grandfather had moved to smyrna, where he and his son 
georgios were consuls-general for France, before georgios moved on to 
alexandria. here ioannis Pesmazoglou was born in 1857, one of seven sons, 
most of whom became bankers and businessmen, despite their father’s 
bankruptcy in 1873. ioannis attended the Protestant school in alexandria, 
which he left in 1875. in this year the impoverished, ambitious young man 
started his professional career at crédit lyonnais d’alexandrie. head of this 
branch was georgios averoff, a business partner and friend of ioannis’ father. 
alongside his work ioannis wrote articles for egyptian newspapers; and, after 
averoff had given him some start capital of his own for financial transactions, 
he acquired a fortune by speculating on the stock exchange. in december 
1876 he founded his own private bank, which he was able to enlarge through 
various affiliations with other banks. he earned a great deal of money in the 
cotton trade with the us and at a very young age became one of the most 
influential bankers in alexandria, also specialising in the transfer of money 
from greek businessmen in the diaspora to their homeland. Pesmazoglou 
thus became interested in greece as a financial market and started to instigate 
his networks in athens. in the house of the powerful constantinople banker 
andreas syngros47 in athens he met irini, the niece of syngros and daughter 
of the greek admiral nikolaos miaoulis. he married her in 1888.48 during 
the economic crisis of 1893 king george asked the greeks in egypt to help 
46 if not otherwise indicated, the following biographical information is taken from 
vovolinis and vovolinis, Μέγα ελληνικόν βιογραφικόν λεξικόν, pp. 324-344. 
47 in his memoires, syngros did not mention Pesmazoglou, although he reflected on 
the necessity of a joint-stock bank in athens. see andreas syngros, Απομνημονεύματα 
[memoirs] (athens 1908), new edition: ed. a. angelou and m. c. chatziioannou, athens: 
estia, 1998, vol. iii, pp. 40 ff. 
48 in addition, ioannis’ cousin olympia Pasmaglou married constantinos Zannos, 
member of the influential industrial Zannos family. in 1884 constantinos’ brother 
aristovoulos Zannos founded Zannos, roche & cie together with emmanuel roche. This 
company was transformed into the société vinicole et d’industries agricoles sa in 1900, 
with the financial support of the ba. in 1906 the société vinicole was merged with the 
société e. charilaos to form the société hellenique de vins et spiritueux (see also note 
119). i thank nikos Pantelakis (historical archives of the ete) for this information. The 
connections give an idea of how family and business relationships were intertwined. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 01:34:57 |
 Fighting the Financial Crisis in Greece 117
their homeland, and in a patriotic gesture Pesmazoglou donated a huge sum 
to the greek state. With his engagement he managed to attract the attention 
of the king, and he finally met him personally in the house of syngros. The 
king honoured him for his donation with the silver cross. in the same year 
Pesmazoglou published his thoughts on the possibilities of reform for the 
greek financial system.49
independent from Pesmazoglou’s sphere of influence, in 1893 a new bank 
was founded in athens as a joint-stock company (the first joint-stock bank in 
greece) by a group of greek bankers: the bank of athens.50 its key objective 
was to grant commercial and industrial loans to greek entrepreneurs in 
greece and abroad, especially in turkey and egypt. When the ba opened a 
branch in alexandria in 1896, Pesmazoglou affiliated his own bank with the 
ba. The new organisation had capital of 4 million drachmas by this time. only 
one year later Pesmazoglou won a crucial vote in ba’s annual stockholder 
meeting against the former director, antonios kallegris, and so became the 
bank’s new director.51 it should be noted that his relative andreas syngros 
and his patron georgios averoff took part in the meeting as important 
stockholders. 
Pesmazoglou is said to have been a very charming and endearing character 
with high political ambitions and rhetorical talent.52 as director of the ba, 
he introduced the modern French-styled banking practices which he had 
learnt at the crédit lyonnais.53 his new style alarmed the very conservative 
49 ioannis Pesmazoglou, Projet de règlement des finances helléniques, alexandria 1893.
50 see ete, http://ha.nbg.gr/en/generalresmat.asp; kostas kostis and basias tsoko-
poulos, Οι τράπεζες στην ελλάδα, 1898-1928 [banks in greece, 1898-1928], athens 1988, 
pp. 42 ff, pp. 48-52.
51 hubert bonin, “la banque d’athènes, point de jonction entre deux outre-mers 
bancaires (1904-1953)”, Outre-mers. Revue d’histoire 330-331 (July 2001), p. 18, note 14. For 
the first very positive report of Pesmazoglou after the first six months as director, see ioannis 
Pesmazoglou, Ἔκθεσις τοῦ γενικοῦ διευθυντοῦ τῆς Τραπέζης Ἀθηνῶν κ. Ι. Γ. Πεσμαζόγλου 
πρὸς τὸ συμβούλιον τῆς Τραπέζης, εἰσηγητήριος τοῦ ἰσολογισμοῦ τῆς Αης ἑξαμηνίας, 
1897 [record of the general director of the bank of athens mr i. g. Pesmazoglou for the 
administrative council of the bank, on the occasion of the balance sheet, 1897], athens 1897.
52 n. n., “banque d’athènes”, Reforme Smyrne (20 march 1905), historical archives 
of the banque de l’union Parisienne (heareafter buP), cn 253. The article reports that the 
metropolitan of smyrna vassilios blessed the new building of the bank: “la cérémonie 
religieuse terminée, l’éminent et sympathique directeur général de cet établissement financier, 
monsieur Pesmazoglu, a pris la parole et dans un discours plein de charme et de figures 
poétiques a remercié l’assistance pour la manifestation qu’elle a bien voulu lui faire […].”
53 For example, the establishment of cashiers’ desks; see kostis and tsokopoulos, Οι 
τράπεζες στην ελλάδα, 1898-1928, p. 48.
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greek banking sector, especially the traditional national bank of greece, 
which had previously refused any modernisation. Pesmazoglou invested in 
various economic sectors: in greek shipping companies, in the construction 
of the greek railway system, road building and the tobacco trade. The ba 
also earned a lot of money through speculation with spanish bonds during 
the spanish-american War after 1899. Pesmazoglou furthermore developed 
multifaceted philanthropic interests, not only becoming the vice-president 
of the society of the Friends of technical development in athens, but also 
giving donations for the building of churches in athens, collecting donations 
for the refugees from asia minor and giving 150,000 drachmas to the society 
of commercial clerks to found a commercial school in athens. 
Pesmazolgou soon realised that the currant trade was one of the most 
important fields requiring efficient economic reform in his “new” homeland. 
in 1898, after only two years in athens, he joined a congress for the discussion 
of the currant question and in this context published a memoir about a 
greek currant bank.54 The requested bank was indeed founded in 1899, as 
discussed above. in 1900 the ba founded a society for Winegrowing and the 
agriculture industry with capital of 200,000 drachmas, which gave cheap 
credit to farmers. The capital of the ba increased to 10 million drachmas in 
the same year, and it was able to open branches in romania (1902), london 
(1903), constantinople (1904), smyrna (1904) and cairo (1905). The rapid rise 
of the bank continued. in 1904 the capital of the bank was increased to 20 
million drachmas and shares were now offered on the Paris stock exchange 
with the help of the buP. in the following year, the greek currant bank 
went bankrupt, causing great unrest in the growing regions. For the ba this 
meant the loss of the capital invested thus far. in this situation of national 
emergency on the one hand, and impressive personal business success on the 
other, Pesmazoglou decided to intervene in the difficult currant question and 
to win over foreign capitalists to a monopoly company for the currant trade. 
2. banque de l’union Parisienne, Paris
hubert bonin deemed that the ba was a key institution for putting greece 
on the agenda of French financial interests in the mediterranean. although 
intensive business relationships had existed between some houses of the 
Paris haute banque and greece since the 1820s, the business did indeed 
54 ioannis g. Pesmazoglou, Ὑπόμνημα περὶ ἱδρύσεως σταφιδικῆς τραπέζης [memorandum 
about the foundation of a currant bank], athens 1898.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 01:34:57 |
 Fighting the Financial Crisis in Greece 119
take on a new dimension at the turn of the century, and the relationship 
between the buP and the ba played a key role in this expansion. ioannis 
Pesmazoglou was the person who first contacted the Paris-based buP to 
propose closer relations between the two banks.55 The buP was founded in 
1904 to profit from the possibilities of the internationalisation of banking.56 
several important houses of the haute banque of Paris like michel heine, 
alphonse mallet and Paul mirabaud were amongst the founders of this new 
joint-stock bank. some of them, such as de neuflize & cie, looked back on 
a long philhellenic tradition: Jean abraham andré Poupart de neuflize ii 
(1784-1836) had collected donations for greece during the greek War of 
independence (1821-1829).57 lucien villars was appointed as the buP’s first 
director, formerly responsible for international relations at the banque de 
Paris et Paribas.58 it is of course hardly surprising that the newly founded 
buP, looking for lucrative investment possibilities and with its co-founder 
rodolphe hottinguer very interested in the mediterranean,59 was not averse 
to the proposals of the ba. The fact that Pesmazoglou’s name was already 
known in French financial circles made instilling confidence even easier. 
With 100,000 francs, the buP thus acquired a share in the ba in april 1904 on 
the occasion of the bank’s increase of capital from 10 to 20 million drachmas. 
simultaneously it organised the introduction of the ba shares at the Paris 
stock exchange and delegated a representative to its advisory board. of 
course, this cooperation helped to strengthen the ba’s reputation on the 
French financial market. it is important to note that the first steps of the 
cooperation did not cause a decrease in the risk awareness of the French 
bankers or make them less critical towards proposals by the greek partners. 
For example, villars did not accept Pesmazoglou’s proposal for a new mining 
55 bonin, “la banque d’athènes”, p. 3. 
56 Id., La Banque de l’Union Parisienne (1874/1904-1974). Histoire de la deuxième 
grande banque d’affaires française, collection ecoclio 2, Paris: Plage, 2000, pp. 18 ff. 
57 his grandchild andré de neuflize was educated at andré & cottier, relatives of the 
famous philhellene Jean-gabriel eynard. andré was also secretary of the cabinet of François 
guizot, a French politician well known for his philhellenic politics; see nicolas stoskopf, 
Banquiers et financiers parisiens, les Patrons du second empire, 7, Paris: Picard, 2002, pp. 
266 f. For the commitment to greece, see “secours aux grecs révoltés. Prospectus, listes de 
souscriptions”, in the archives nationales du monde du travail, roubaix, 44 aQ 10.
58 bonin, La Banque de l’Union Parisienne, p. 13. 
59 rodolphe hottinguer followed his father as a member of the board of directors of 
the imperial ottoman bank. he was one of the principal investors of the buP; see stoskopf, 
Banquiers et financiers parisien, pp. 217 f. 
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company in december 1904.60 in the years 1904-1905 the two banks were at 
the beginning of their cooperation, and one may not drew any conclusions 
from the fact that this collaboration continued until 1930 – at the time of the 
founding of the Privileged company, the cooperation was still in its infancy. 
3. hambro & son and emile erlanger, london 
before discussing what made the Privileged company more attractive than 
other proposals of ioannis Pesmazoglou, we have to look at the british 
partners in the business. carl Joachim hambro started in the eighteenth 
century as a trader in hamburg. he then moved to copenhagen as a protégé 
of rothschild. around 1850 c. J. hambro & son became a member of the first 
league of british bankers, by then situated in london. hambro was interested 
in mediterranean business, issuing loans for sardinia and cavour’s struggle 
for the unification of italy, but was also active in the usa and scandinavia.61 
From 1864, hambro & son was the most important source of finance for 
greece in britain, due to its good relationship with the danish royal dynasty 
and Prince Wilhelm. This relationship was based on concrete reasons. after 
the fall of the (bavarian) greek king othon in 1862, a greek delegation came 
to london to look for a new king for their country. it was c. J. hambro who 
introduced the greeks to the danish Prince Wilhelm, who in 1864 became 
king of greece. hambro advanced Wilhelm £10,000 for his enthronement in 
athens. he then enjoyed a privileged position in greece as the king’s personal 
banker.62 When greece was re-opened to the international money market 
in 1879, hambro energetically entered the new market and participated in 
10 of the 13 loans issued to the greek state between 1879 and 1893. even if 
its engagement in greece only reached its peak in 1920, hambro & son was 
doubtless the most important financier of greece in great britain at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. so for hambro & son the relevance of a 
40-year tradition of financing greek projects and the greek state cannot be 
underestimated. seen from the greek perspective, there were few alternatives 
to hambro & son for Pesmazoglou on the london market. however, in the 
case of the Privileged company, hambro & son was not the principal agent 
on the british market: in the buP correspondence its name is not mentioned 
60 Pesmazoglou to villars (17-27 december 1904), buP, cn 252. 
61 ioanna P. minoglou, “The rise and Fall of the house of hambros in greece, 1864-
1940”, in hubert bonin (ed.), Transnational Companies, 19th-20th Centuries, collection 
ecoclio, Paris: Plage, 2002, pp. 401-417, esp. p. 402. 
62 bo bramsen and kathleen Wain, The Hambros, 1779-1979, london: Joseph, 1979. 
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very often. rather than hambro & son, his longstanding partner emile 
erlanger was the one corresponding regularly with the buP and the ba.
The erlanger family, originally situated in heddernheim near Frankfurt 
and later in Frankfurt itself,63 also had close connections to greece. emile 
erlanger (born 19 June 1832) was a bill broker in Frankfurt like his father 
raphael erlanger.64 he became consul-general of greece in Frankfurt in 1855.65 
of course we should not overestimate the importance of the consul-general 
function, which was very popular among Frankfurt bankers at this time;66 
but erlanger did indeed use his function to initiate business relationships 
with greece, and very shortly after his appointment he visited athens and 
met with the director of the national bank of greece, georgios stavros. he 
also became acquainted with stavros’ sister-in-law and his niece. in a letter, 
he thanked stavros for the very pleasant meeting and welcomed any kind of 
63 unfortunately, there is practically no literature about emile erlanger and his bank. 
an exhibition catalogue gives some information about the branch of the banker family that 
settled in ingelheim; see gabriele mendelssohn, Die Familie Erlanger. Bankiers – Mäzene – 
Künstler, ingelheim: leinpfad, 2005. in the benchmarks about Frankfurt financial history, 
emile erlanger and the family are mentioned very briefly. raphael erlanger participated in 
1862 in the founding of the Frankfurter hypothekenbank, a joint-stock bank and the first 
solely german mortgage bank; see carl-ludwig holtfrerich, Finanzplatz Frankfurt. Von 
der mittelalterlichen Messestadt zum europäischen Bankenzentrum, munich: beck, 1999, p. 
164; ralf roth, “von der Zollvereinsgründung bis zur annexion der stadt, 1834-1870”, in 
Werner Plumpe and dieter rebentisch (eds), “Dem Flor der hiesigen Handlung”. 200 Jahre 
Industrie- und Handelskammer Frankfurt am Main [IHK Frankfurt am Main 1808-2008], 
Frankfurt am main: Frankfurter societäts-druckerei, 2008, pp. 80-103, esp. p. 97. 
64 raphael erlanger tried several times to transfer his own concession as bill broker 
to his son before emile was of full age, because raphael himself was ill, but the Frankfurt 
counsel refused to give the concession to the son earlier; see institut für stadtgeschichte 
Frankfurt (hereafter isF), nachlassakten 1851/90. in the application we find the school 
certificate of emile from the musterschule in Frankfurt (29 June 1851), which attested to 
his good attainment in all subjects, especially history. also, the Protestant preacher of the 
st catharinen church in Frankfurt attested to the young man’s assiduity and intelligence. 
in 1853 the counsel finally gave its agreement to the transfer of the concession (17 august 
1853), isF, rechnei nach 1816, 1907. 
65 appointment of emile erlanger as consul-general of greece in Frankfurt (26 may 
1855), isF, rechnei nach 1816, 252. The Staats- und Adreß-Handbuch der Freien Stadt 
Frankfurt, Frankfurt am main: krug, 1847-1866, of the year 1856 mentions emile erlanger 
as first consul-general of greece in Frankfurt. his father had been consul-general of Portugal 
since 1855, later also of sweden and norway. 
66 For example, carl mayer, baron rothschild, was consul-general of Parma and 
consul-general of sicily, and anselm salomon, baron rothschild, was consul-general of 
austria; see ibid.
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business relationship in the future.67 Further to this aim he enclosed a letter 
from his brother raphael erlanger in which raphael explained the business 
conditions he could offer the national bank of greece.68 indeed, a first 
business transaction took place in april 1856.69 
in 1859 erlanger moved to Paris where he founded his own maison de 
banque with 500,000 francs as capital.70 he continued the contacts with the 
national bank of greece.71 in the 1860s these relationships deepened.72 in 
Paris he soon became consul-general of greece again and kept this function 
for several decades. he organised the contributions of greece to the universal 
exhibitions of 1867 and 1878.73 maybe anti-semitic prejudices contributed to 
his reputation as a ruthless and greedy banker, but on the other hand erlanger 
was well known for his widespread philanthropy. after the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870, he moved to london.74 
erlanger was largely engaged in the mediterranean, especially in egypt 
and tunisia. at the end of the 1890s his relationship with the national bank 
of greece became even closer, and erlanger intermediated between the greek 
and French as well as belgian banks.75 in 1902 he participated in a railway 
loan for greece together with hambro & son and the national bank.76 The 
first loan failed, but the very successful second and third ones of 1904 and 
1906 were interpreted as signs of the economic revival of the country, as well 
as the resurrection of the confidence of international financial markets after 
the establishment of the international Financial commission in 1898. at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when the currency rate of the drachma 
improved, erlanger’s relationships with greece and especially with the 
national bank intensified. in June 1901 he thanked streit, the governor of 
the bank, with warm words for the honour that he had bestowed on them 
by spending time with erlanger’s son emile in Florence.77 it was not only 
67 emile erlanger to the governor of the national bank (arrived 8-20 July 1855), ete, 
a1s23yia´F53. 
68 raphael erlanger to stavros (ete) (arrived 24 June 1855), ete, a1s23yia´F53. 
69 emile erlanger to stavros (ete) (april 1856), ete, a1s23yia ´F53. 
70 stoskopf, Banquiers et financiers parisiens, pp. 162 ff.
71 emile erlanger to the governor of the national bank (1 september 1860), ete, 
a1s23yia´F55. 
72 erlanger to kanas (12 February 1868), ete, a1s23yia´F53. 
73 stoskopf, Banquiers et financiers parisiens, pp. 162 ff.
74 Ibid.
75 emile erlanger to streit (ete) (may and June 1899), ete, a1s10y3 ´F5. 
76 bramsen and Wain, The Hambros, p. 331. 
77 erlanger to ete (24 June 1901), ete, a1s25y2 ´F32. 
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erlanger’s relationships with greece that were well established, but also 
those between erlanger and hambro & son. at the time when the Privileged 
company was being launched the two banks, hambro & son and erlanger, 
cooperated in many fields, and everard hambro used to address erlanger in 
his letters very familiarly as ‘mon cher emile’.78 The possibility of continuing 
this well-established and faithful cooperation for an investment in greece, 
where both british banks were interested in expanding their investments, 
might have been very attractive for both of them. it may well also be the case 
that both bankers were impressed by the track record of the extraordinarily 
successful greek banker ioannis Pesmazoglou, who seemed to be the rising 
star of the promising greek market in which both of them were variously 
engaged and interested. 
The Privileged Company to Protect Production and Trade in Currants 
although, especially in the case of the british bankers, strong path dependencies 
to former investments in greece have to be taken into account, their evaluation 
of the actual project is of course the key to researching their risk management 
techniques. What made the idea of the Privileged company so attractive to 
them? to answer this question, one has to look at the purposes and conditions 
of the newly founded company. 
in his memorandum to emile erlanger, Pesmazoglou pointed out that the 
company would contribute to the welfare of all actors in the currant trade: 
“The overproduction of currants and the consequent heavy loss to the currant 
growers preoccupies for many years now not only the greek government and 
people, but also those who have an interest in the article, and, in a general way, 
all people who desire the welfare of greece.”79 he explained the problems 
78 The relationship got worse in 1909. everard hambro explained to his son eric that 
the business practices of erlanger were not comparable with those of hambro: “as far as 
erlanger is concerned he is simply trying to get commissions. his thoughts are only to make 
money. We have so far looked at business from another point of view, and that is probably 
why the two names stand in a different category.” he advised eric not to collaborate with 
erlanger for a new greek loan (29 February 1909, london metropolitan archives [hereafter 
lma], ms. 19108). in 1911 eric hambro explicitly pointed out that he would not cooperate 
with erlanger in the project of a loan for the city of athens; see hambro to the city of 
athens (21 march 1911), lma, ms. 19109. 
79 memorandum, “a project for the formation of a company to regulate the currant 
trade”, ib, 10/18. not only is this memorandum found in the ionian bank archives, but 
also in the letter from emile erlanger to Pesmazoglou (18 may 1905), which is mentioned 
later (see note 83 below); so it seems likely that either Pesmazoglou or erlanger sent these 
documents to the ionian bank to inform it about their plans. 
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of the situation. The law of June 1904 dictated that the currant bank was 
obliged to buy the surplus revenue of the non-exported crop at a fixed and 
very low price. on the exported currants a payment in kind of 35% or 40% 
was required, but the currants thus collected were used only for industrial 
purposes and earned little income for the treasury. on the other hand, the 
currant bank was unable to fulfil its obligation to buy the surplus, because 
its capital was locked up in loans to the currant growers, who were not able 
to pay the money back because of the very bad price they got for their crop.
Pesmazoglou wanted to ameliorate this insupportable situation. his 
purpose was “the giving of a greater stability to the currant trade”.80 Price 
crashes were to be avoided and lost confidence in the merchandise restored. 
The author emphasised the beneficial effect of his project for the farmers: “il 
conjurera aussi les dangers qui menacent aujourd’hui la banque ‘stafidiki’ 
et une grande partie des intérêts de la nombreuse population viticole.”81 
The plan was to found a greek company with a capital of 20 million gold 
drachmas (£800,000 or 20,000,000 francs),82 divided into 200,000 shares of 100 
drachmas each. The dividend per year was guaranteed at 6%.83 a proportion 
of 5 million drachmas was reserved for the state-owned currant bank, which 
was allowed to deposit the full amount within four years. 
Prior to 1 July of every year, the Privileged company had to determine a 
price for the surplus crop, which was classified in categories. The company 
was obliged to buy all currants that had not been sold abroad for higher 
prices by the growers before this date. export of these revenue currants in 
their natural state was not allowed, so as not to ruin world market prices; 
they had instead to be turned into wines, other alcohol or other products 
within the country. The company held the monopoly to sell alcohol in 
greece, and it was not allowed for anybody in the entire country to make 
80 Émile erlanger to John g. Pesmazoglou (18 may 1905), lma, ms. s 19106. 
81 Pesmazoglou, “Projet pour la formation d’une société pour combattre la crise du 
raisin de corinthe”, buP, cn 252. 
82 of course, it should be noted that these sums are converted on the basis of the 
theoretically fixed exchange rate of 1:1 between the gold drachma and the franc. in 1905 
the paper drachma was still traded at 0.23. This meant that the invested foreign capital 
would result in a much higher sum of paper drachmas. 
83 erlanger to Pesmazoglou (18 may 1905), lma, ms. 19106. beside the regular shares, 
the aim was to introduce 800,000 founders’ shares without any nominal value. The founders’ 
shares would participate up to 50% of the profits after 6% had been paid on the normal 
shares and a certain amount to the reserve. 
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alcohol from any materials other than raisins.84 The company had to pay 
taxes to the treasury on all exported currants, so the treasury could count on 
a fixed sum in time. in return, the company received a fee of 19 drachmas per 
1000 venetian pounds on the dried fruits exported earlier in the year, which 
was nearly double the sum it had to pay to the treasury. it had to provide 
warehouses to store all of the harvest for free. For this duty it received an 
additional tax of 7 drachmas per 1000 venetian pounds on the total amount 
of currants produced. Pesmazoglou counted on an annual profit of about 4 
million drachmas, equal to 5% of the invested capital. For the missing 1% 
of the dividend Pesmazoglou seems to have depended on the exchange rate 
profits and a surplus resulting from a possible growth in consumption or 
decline in the crop. on the other hand, he saw dangers for the company if 
more than 330 million venetian pounds of currants were produced. so the 
creation of new vineyards was prohibited by law for 15 years, the duration 
of the concession. additionally the company was encouraged to advertise 
currants in new markets to enlarge the consumption of this natural greek 
monopoly abroad.85 of course, in his memorandum Pesmazoglou did not 
mention the objections raised by the small greek currant merchants to the 
monopoly nor the strong opposition of greek legislators. his partners must 
have known about these problems, because they were not surprised when 
troubles in the greek parliament emerged later on. 
The Establishment of the Company 
already in 1903 Pesmazoglou started travelling to london and Paris to check 
the situation for the Privileged company, though the first concrete pre-
negotiations in 1905 were obviously carried out by brokers. on the one hand, 
a commission of £500 for a mr de Zoete is mentioned;86 on the other hand, 
84 so, in fact, the law gave a kind of monopoly to the company. besides, Pesmazoglou 
planned to produce and export sweet and dry wines to all of europe excluding France and 
italy; see Pesmazoglou to buP (4 august 1905), “annexe indiquant le detail de l’utilisation 
du raisin sec à la disposition de la société”. he also intended to use the alcohol for lighting 
and automobiles, buP, cn 252. 
85 erlanger to Pesmazoglou (18 may 1905), lma, ms. 19106. in this letter erlanger 
agreed to participate and to buy 50,000 shares (£4) and 200,000 founders’ shares (£1) 
if Pesmazoglou were able to find guarantors for the remaining shares by the following 
summer; further conditions were that the law be passed by the greek parliament and that 
all shares were issued by first-class banking houses in Paris, greece, egypt and london. 
86 hambro to erlanger (23 may1905), lma, ms. 19106. 
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sauerbach, Thalmann & cie charged commission fees for the intermediation 
of 1.5 francs per share before Pesmazoglou sent the first draft of his project 
to the buP.87 it is not clear why these intermediaries were necessary since 
the ba and buP were already in contact. obviously not only the partner, but 
also the project itself needed influential and trustworthy advocates. in his 
drafts, Pesmazoglou emphasised his long preparative deliberations with the 
members of the greek cabinet88 and he also published his considerations in a 
memorandum.89 later on, Pesmazoglou managed to induce edmond Théry, 
the editor of the journal L’Économiste Européen and author of the book La 
Grèce actuelle au point de vue économique et financier, to write a scientific 
memorandum about the question of the currant trade, which he gave to 
those he hoped to win as partners. The memorandum strongly reinforced 
his plans.90 
so the greek banker was clearly going to win the French group for his 
plans, but how did he come into contact with the british group? First of 
all, Pesmazoglou journeyed to london, where he discussed his ideas with 
the dried Fruit trade company.91 he indeed managed to persuade them 
to join his project, by guaranteeing them a voice in the administrative 
council of the company and a sum of at least £5000 and at most £20,000 
per year for advertising currants in great britain.92 in this way he not only 
avoided further problems with the lobbying group but even pushed it to 
write a letter to the Foreign ministry, asking for political assistance for 
the new monopoly company. in fact, this time the Foreign ministry did 
not intervene, notwithstanding the protests of some individual merchants 
87 sauerbach, Thalmann & cie to buP (16 may 1905), buP, cn 253. sauerbach wanted 
to give half of that commission to the buP; buP, cn 205. 
88 “Projet de creation d’une société privilegiée d’industrie viticole”, buP, cn 252. 
89 ioannis g. Pesmazoglou, Περὶ διαρρυθμίσεως τοῦ σταφιδικοῦ ζητήματος. εἰσήγησις καὶ 
ἐπεξήγησις αὐτού [about the solution of the currant question: proposal and explanation], 
athens 1905.
90 edmond Théry, “Projet pour la formation d’une société pour combater la crise du 
raisin de corinthe”, buP, cn 252; rapport de m. edmond Théry, in ete, a1s28y2 ´F23. 
in his book, published in 1905, Théry gave a similar blueprint of the project, which 
corresponds with Pesmazoglou’s concept; see edmond Théry, La Grèce actuelle au point 
de vue économique et financier, Paris 1905. 
91 This journey was even mentioned in the record of the british ambassador; see elliot 
to lansdowne (18 may 1905, 24 may 1905), na, Fo 32/770. 
92 elliot to lansdowne (18 may 1905, 24 may 1905), na, Fo 32-770; london dried 
Fruit trade association to lansdowne (21 June 1905), na, Fo 32-770. 
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against the planned monopoly.93 after his return to athens, Pesmazoglou 
explained his idea in great detail to the british ambassador and pointed out that 
the monopoly would not increase the price of currants for the british public.94 
how did Pesmazoglou come into contact with the british financiers? 
in the case of the hambros, it should be noted that in 1903 the bank was 
already interested in the project of a greek monopoly company, which in 
the end was not carried out; but in 1905 not everard hambro but erlanger 
was Pesmazoglou’s first contact person. The contact was organised through 
demetrios georgiades, who had been an extraordinary agent of erlanger’s for 
several years. georgiades had tried to set up a company for the currant trade 
himself but failed. after this failure he proposed that erlanger should be won 
over as a partner in the ba’s plans. obviously there was no possibility for 
Pesmazoglou to contact erlanger without the detour via georgiades, although 
the relationship between the two greeks was poor. The conflict worsened 
during the proceedings and, after a certain point, georgiades actually tried to 
stop Pesmazoglou. he damaged Pesmazoglou’s project by publishing articles 
in greece which described the Privileged company as exploitation of the 
country. georgiades furthermore tried to persuade erlanger that the project 
was dangerous.95 What caused georgiades’ change of mind? apparently there 
was great competition between the two bankers. georgiades was established 
as a financial expert for greece in Paris – a position which Pesmazoglou tried 
to conquer and to monopolise for himself – but georgiades also profited 
from excellent connections in French financial circles96 and published several 
memoranda on the greek financial situation in French newspapers.97 after 
93 For example, the greek merchant schinas protested about the fact “that a clique 
composed of several influential persons is endeavouring to obtain a kind of covert 
monopoly of the currant trade”; schinas to lansdowne (24 may 1905), na, Fo 32-770. The 
board of trade clarified that it had no further objections to the greek proposals (31 may 
1905), na, Fo 32-770. 
94 elliot to lansdowne (June 1905), na, Fo 32-770. 
95 Pesmazoglou to villars (19 september – 1 october 1905), buP, cn 252. 
96 see, for example, Paul beauregard, “la question financière en grèce”, Le Monde 
économique (13 october 1910). 
97 démétrius georgiades, “le développement économique de la grèce contemporaine” 
(extract from L’Économiste français, 6 February1892); id., La Grèce économique et financière 
en 1893. Réponse à M. E. F. G. Law, délégué de gouvernement anglais, Paris 1893; id., La 
Grèce et ses créanciers avec introduction de Paul Beauregard (Articles publiés dans le Monde 
économique les 22. et 29.9. et les 6., 13. et 20. octobre 1894), Paris 1894; id., Les jeux olympiques 
a Athènes (Extrait du Monde économique des 9. et 16.5.1896), Paris 1896; id., Les associations 
coopératives helléniques à la fin du XVIIIe siècle et les sociétés par actions modernes en Grèce 
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the turn of the century georgiades advertised intensively for the unification 
of greek foreign debt.98 obviously georgiades’ activities in Paris constituted 
serious competition for Pesmazoglou. 
The conflicts between the two greeks were to escalate in the midst of the 
proceedings of the Privileged company. in a letter to the buP’s director, villars, 
Pesmazoglou painted a quite unpleasant picture of georgiades and pointed 
out his very bad reputation. he told villars that georgiades had been banished 
from the ottoman empire because of his attempts to blackmail the ottoman 
government, and that he later had to leave Paris because of conflicts with the 
comptoir d’escompte and the greek diaspora banker vlasto.99 The letter is 
clearly an attempt by Pesmazoglou to destroy georgiades’ reputation. The 
reason is obvious from the sources: when it became clear that the business was 
becoming established, georgiades claimed the position of an administrator 
on the administrative board of the Privileged company. Pesmazoglou 
refused to give him this position. The conflict about this question continued 
for several months before Pesmazoglou finally succeeded in pushing his 
competitor georgiades out of the Privileged company – a goal he achieved 
only by threatening to retire from the council himself if georgiades should 
join it.100 important for our question is the fact that erlanger’s involvement 
in the Privileged company was due to his “own” broker, with whom he had 
well-established relationships; it was not possible for another greek banker 
to circumnavigate this agent on the way to erlanger. The conflict between 
Pesmazoglou and georgiades shows how very important and hard-fought the 
broker’s position on the French financial market was. 
once the contacts to the foreign capitalists were in place, thanks to 
the brokers, Pesmazoglou sent his proposal to them. The reaction of the 
international partners to his plan was positive – and very swift. a letter 
from everard hambro to emile erlanger written from Paris on 23 may 1905 
informed the latter that the hearing with the buP had already successfully 
taken place. all the bankers were interested in a huge consortium to split 
the investment risk, and the british were willing to pay the costs for this 
shared risk management. The claims of the French were quite demanding, 
but hambro explained, that “Je suis convaincu qu’on n’arrivera pas à les 
réduire.”101 in accordance with ordinary banking practice, all participants 
received commission as follows: the buP got 200,000 francs, erlanger (who 
(Extrait du Monde économique des 5., 12. et 19.10.1907), Paris 1907.
98 “Projekte mit den griechischen schulden”, Frankfurter Zeitung (20 February 1910).
99 Pesmazoglu to villars (19 september – 1 october 1905), buP, cn 252. 
100 Ibid. 
101 hambro to erlanger (23 may 1905), lma, ms. 19106. 
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obviously had to share with hambro) and the ba each received 100,000.102 The 
bankers were united in doing everything to prevent the business appearing 
too speculative. The interesting fact is that there was no discussion at all about 
whether the project in general should be carried out or not. The willingness 
of the partners to participate seems to have been clarified through the brokers 
before the first serious proceedings started. 
in the following months Pesmazoglou tried to win the greek government 
and the parliament over to the project and to coordinate the interests of the 
greek side with those of the foreign capitalists. For example, the buP tried 
to push back the greek currant bank and its participation in the company’s 
profit. Pesmazoglou replied that the participation of the greek currant bank 
was necessary to win over the majority of deputies in parliament and to make 
the project more popular.103 he also managed to persuade the national bank 
of greece to enter into a huge participation of 2.5 million drachmas.104 This 
participation of the prestigious bank was very important for the reputation of 
the project. during the parliamentary proceedings Pesmazoglou had to adapt 
to each decision and modification of the contract with numerous telegrams 
and letters exchanged with the buP.105 The foreign banks did not generally 
empower their greek partner, but wanted to make all decisions on their own. 
They explained their caution through mentioning their “responsabilité morale” 
vis-à-vis their partners and clients.106 however, this was not the only reason why 
the proceedings became complicated. in greece not everybody agreed with the 
proposal. its antagonists were afraid that the company would destroy all the 
small currant trade businesses in the country. They blamed the company for 
enriching foreign capitalists at the cost of the successful currant growers who 
did not actually need any help.107 The discussions in parliament were excited, 
but after a session of 48 hours Pesmazoglou was able to inform the buP that the 
second reading of the law had been passed.108 after “débats orageux” the law 
was finally accepted on 29 July 1905 at five o’clock in the morning.109 
after the law was passed, there was no time to be lost. in august the 
capital of the new company was collected from the participants.110 The ba 
102 villars to Pesmazoglou (26 may 1905), buP, cn 252. 
103 Pesmazoglou to buP (7 July 1905), buP, cn 253. 
104 Pesmazoglou to buP (12 July 1905), buP, cn 253. 
105 Pesmazoglou to buP (18 July 1905), buP, cn 253; buP to Pesmazoglou (12 July 
1905), buP, cn 253.
106 hambro to erlanger (23 may 1905), lma, ms. 19106. 
107 For example, an article in an unnamed greek financial newspaper, which elliot 
translated for lansdowne (4 July 1905), na, Fo 32-770. 
108 Pesmazoglou to buP (27 July 1905), buP, cn 253.
109 Pesmazoglou to buP (29 July 1905), buP, cn 253.
110 The ba was bound to install the company within 30 days after the convention was 
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was the largest stockholder with 27,000 shares (each at 250 francs), followed 
by the english group with 17,500.111 la marseillaise took 5000, while the buP 
took only 3000, in spite of the high level of commission they had earned.112 
The houses of the Paris haute banque, such as heine & cie (800), mirabaud 
(400), dreyfus (100), vlasto (200) and de neuflize (1200), to mention only a 
few examples, contributed as well. sauerbach, Thalmann & cie, who had 
been brokers for the business, bought 1000 shares. it is very interesting to 
see that even the managers of the buP bought Privileged company shares 
on their private accounts as well: villars 250, Wehrung 100, barbé 100 and 
lustgarten 50. edmond Théry, the author of the memorandum mentioned 
above, bought 200 shares.113 The actors in this business must really have 
counted on the success of the company. 
The Privileged company was able to start its business in august, so that 
the crop of 1905 could be merchandised. conflicts about the special treatment 
of the state-owned currant bank continued, for example the question of 
whether this bank had to contribute to the commissions for the brokers or 
not (as it finally had to).114 also the discussions about the composition of the 
board of administration of the Privileged company continued.115 The buP 
hesitated about whom to appoint as a member of the board of administration 
of the new company and decided finally on Zaphirios matsas, the later 
successor of Pesmazoglou at the ba.116 
The introduction of the stock at the athens and Paris stock exchanges 
in november 1905 did not achieve the desired success. The ba bewailed the 
signed; see convention (13-15 July 1905), na, Fo 32/770. 
111 or £700. The balance sheet totals of hambro at this time were about £5,500,000, so 
the sum invested in these greek stocks was comparatively small; see bramsen and Wain, 
The Hambros, p. 330. 
112 nationalbank für deutschland, the german bank with the closest relations to 
greece, bought 400 shares; see overview of shareholders, ete, a1s28y2 ´F23. 
113 Société privilégiée pour la protection et le commerce du raisin de Corinthe (29 august 
1905), buP, cn 252. 
114 For example, buP to ba (12 september 1905), buP, cn 253.
115 The greek government was represented by a royal commissioner; see memoir 
conseil d’administration, buP, cn 252. 
116 Wehrung to villars (20 august 1905); Pesmazoglou to Wehrung (1-14 august 
1905), buP, cn 252. matsas later came into conflict with the law; see bonin, “la banque 
d’athènes”, p. 19, note 28. see also Z. k. matsas, Ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει τῆς Ἀθηναϊκῆς 
Τραπέζης [The truth in the affair of the bank of athens], athens 1914; id., Ἡ ὑπόθεσις τῆς 
Ἀθηναϊκῆς Τραπέζης κρινομένῃ ἀπὸ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἐργασιῶν [The affair of the bank of 
athens, judged from the order of works], athens 1915. 
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bear market of the shares, which in Pesmazoglou’s opinion resulted from 
intentionally launched rumours.117 The syndicate for the support of the offering 
was extended until december 1906 to avoid a further decrease in the share 
price.118 during this time Pesmazoglou tried to complete the organisation 
of the currant trade and its development. he enforced the foundation of a 
société vinicole for the production of alcohol and other commodities from 
currants, using 6 million drachmas of capital, of which the ba took over 2.35 
million.119 success was moderate, but stable. even if its shares did not boom on 
the stock exchange, the Privileged company organised the efficient execution 
of the currant trade and achieved its aim of stabilising international prices for 
raisins, though at a lower level than before 1893. especially for the farmers, 
the stabilisation of their income was of enormous relevance.120 The british 
merchants were content with the work of the company,121 and the shareholders 
received their dividend of 6% each year until the outbreak of the balkan Wars 
in 1912 worsened the situation.122 
The Personal Outcome for Ioannis Pesmazoglou 
For Pesmazoglou himself the project of the Privileged company was not only 
his biggest personal success, but also the starting point of his political career. The 
king honoured him with the order of the saviour, and newspapers trumped each 
other in praising him and lauding the benefit of the newly founded Privileged 
company for the greek people. an article in the Reforme Smyrne glorified his 
117 ba to buP (23 november 1905), buP, cn 253. Pesmazoglou suspected his enemy 
georgiades; see “copie des telegrammes communiqués par mm. erlanger & co”, buP, 
cn 252. greek Prime minister rallis was asked to act as an arbiter between the two greek 
bankers because their differences endangered the whole project, but refused. The buP 
anyway advised the greek partner not to buy any additional shares but left the support of 
the shares to the French partners; see buP to ba (21 december 1905), buP, cn 253.
118 sauerbach, Thalmann & cie to buP (14 may 1906); acte syndicate, buP, cn 252. 
119 Pesmazoglou to villars (1-14 Februrary 1906), buP, cn 252. The buP was not very 
enthusiastic about this plan for a new company that would change only the etiquette but 
not the manner of acting; see villars to Pesmazoglou (9 February 1906), buP, cn 253. one 
of the companies united to create the société vinicole was Zannos, roche & cie, property 
of Pesmazoglou’s relative aristovoulos Zannos; see also footnote 48 above.
120 on the further development of prices, see Frangiadis, “Αγροτική οικονομία”, p. 167. 
121 international Financial commission to the british Foreign office (10 september 
1906), na, Fo 32/770. 
122 on the currant trade after 1910, see Frangiadis, “Αγροτική οικονόμια”, p. 167 f. in 
1913 the company had to struggle to pay the dividend; see J. courcelle to ete (21 June 
1913), ete, a1s28y2 ´F23.
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contribution to the welfare of the country: “[…] est lui qui a inculqué à la grèce 
l’esprit nouveau; l’esprit de l’économie politique, l’esprit du travail, l’esprit de 
l’initiative créatrice”.123 so it is not astonishing that in 1905 the banker became 
the deputy of kalamata in parliament, where he was a follower of Theodoros 
delagiannis’ party, continuing activities after delagiannis’ assassination in June 
1905 under his successor, dimitrios rallis. Pesmazoglou was even introduced as 
a certain future candidate for the position of minister of finance,124 and a street 
in athens was named after him in 1905.125 
one can concede that Pesmazoglou had been very successful in com-
municating the new Privileged company as an organisation of extraordinary 
usefulness to the welfare of greece, both within the country and abroad. 
Furthermore, for the ba the project involved an important positioning 
within the organisation of greek export trade and the economy and a 
remarkable position of power vis-à-vis the greek government.126 it also 
enabled Pesmazoglou to present himself as a competent and brave financial 
authority. in 1906 Pesmazoglou was elected to parliament as deputy of 
attica and was addressed as the third most important man in rallis’ party. 
in parliament he commented not only on banking matters, but also on more 
general economic questions, such as the funding of the greek army.127 his 
political career was on a very successful path, when in november 1906 he 
suddenly fell ill with sepsis and died on 24 december. For several weeks the 
greek newspapers were full of obituaries. 
his death was also a hard blow for the ba and its international partners. 
even during his illness, there were already excited telegraphic discussions 
amongst the managers of the buP about his successor: “il faut craindre les 
123 n. n., “les élections parlementaires et m. J. Pesmazoglou”, Reforme Smyrne (21 
september 1905), buP, cn 253. The author reported that Pesmazoglou was requested to 
stand as a candidate at the parliamentary elections by a spontaneous movement of the 
people, but declined because he thought he could better serve greek affairs in his position 
at the ba – a very patriotic and heroic abstinence, the journalist pointed out. 
124 n. g. amira, “m. Pesmazoglu”, Reforme Smyrne (20 July 1905), buP, cn 253. 
125 vovolinis and vovolinis, Μέγα ελληνικόν βιογραφικόν λεξικόν, p. 339.
126 Frangiadis, “Αγροτική οικονομία”, p. 167. 
127 he bewailed that the greek army was the only one in the world which was financed 
mainly through lotteries; see vovolinis and vovolonis, Μέγα ελληνικόν βιογραφικόν 
λεξικόν, p. 338 f. in 1904, he had already published a memorandum about the valuta crisis 
in greece: ioannis g. Pesmazoglou, Ὑπόμνημα περὶ τοῦ καταλληλοτέρου μέσου πρὸς ἄρσιν 
καὶ ριζικὴν θεραπείαν τῆς νομισματικῆς κρίσεως [memoir about proper measures for the 
enhancement and the root therapy of the currency crisis], athens 1904.
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intrigues de tous côtés relatives à successeur Pesmazoglou.”128 When his 
death was announced, the shares of the ba at the stock exchange in athens 
declined dramatically, and the national bank of greece and the buP had 
to warn the shareholders of the ba not to panic.129 at least the affiliation 
of the ba with the industrial bank and the small bank of mytilene, which 
had been organised by Pesmazoglou in the last months of his life, could be 
implemented. This further increased the capital of the ba up to 40 million 
drachmas. The Privileged company also survived the death of its founder,130 
but the other huge project which Pesmazoglou tried to realise was aborted 
with his death. in proceedings with hambro & son, erlanger and rothschild, 
he had tried to obtain the unification of greek foreign debt and its conversion 
into drachmas.131 This idea could not be implemented after Pesmazoglou 
was dead – he was the person who held the personal confidence of the 
foreign bankers. his competitor georgiades picked up the project and tried 
to push it through repeatedly until World War i, but without success. The 
buP continued its cooperation with the ba, but became more sceptical and 
tried to expand its influence within the bank’s organisation. in 1906 charles 
Wehrung joined the ba’s board of directors as second administrator, and in 
1910 andré de neuflize became third administrator to deal with the serious 
problems with the branches in egypt that had been erupting since 1908.132 
The quite stable basis of trust between the ba and buP seems to have suffered 
serious damage after the loss of Pesmazoglou’s charming personality. 
Conclusion
This article started with the question of how trust in the banking business 
can revive after the bankruptcy of a state and severe economic crisis. in order 
to address this question, the project of the Privileged company to Protect 
Production and trade in currants was researched. a first attempt to found 
this institution in 1903 failed due to the adverse framing of international 
mercantile law and due to deficits of trust between the partners. The second 
128 villars to Wehrung (10 december 1906), buP, cn 253. 
129 vovolinis and vovolonis, Μέγα ελληνικόν βιογραφικόν λεξικόν, p. 334.
130 The athens newspaper Άστυ published several articles on him with the headline: 
“on the life of a colossus of progress: the history of Pesmazoglou. The whole life and 
the instructional details of the social and financial rise of the self-acting big man, after 
authentic information for our newspaper” [my translation]; see ibid., p. 325. 
131 Ibid., p. 341. The first French administrator was léon Zarifi in 1904; see ibid., p. 57. 
132 bonin, “la banque d’athènes”, p. 58. bonin depicted in detail the further cooperation 
of the ba and the buP until 1953, when the ba was affiliated to the national bank of greece. 
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attempt in 1905 was successful. The design of the project itself played a 
key role in this success. it not only promised to solve the complicated and 
long-lasting currant question, but allayed the financial problems of the 
state budget. additionally, it undertook to stabilise the currant market and 
domestic greek politics by appeasing the growers. especially for investors 
already involved in the greek market in other projects, like hambro and 
erlanger, these issues were extremely relevant. however, a high dividend for 
the foreign investors was also promised, which could indeed be realised due 
to exchange rate profits. so the Privileged company could be presented as a 
win-win situation for all actors involved.
it becomes obvious that, beside the design of the project itself, in a situation 
of crisis the figure of the broker plays an essential role in the regeneration of 
trust. ioannis Pesmazoglou’s personal share in the construction of the Privileged 
company can hardly be overestimated. This extraordinarily successful banker 
presented himself as a progressive self-made man, as a socially and politically 
responsible and competent specialist for greek finances, not least due to his 
rhetorical talent and negotiation skills. relevant in this context were not only 
his journalistic abilities and philanthropic activities, but also his political 
commitment as a member of the greek parliament and his aspirations in 
the ministry of Finance. his family networks were also helpful to intensify 
his excellent connections to greek industry. These skills, together with his 
winsome personality and business intuition, made cooperation with him very 
attractive for the foreign capitalists trying to expand their market share in the 
obviously fast-ascending greek economy. The competitive situation and grim 
conflict with the Paris-based greek broker demetrius georgiades, who used 
similar methods of presentation, show how hard-fought the position of the 
specialist broker for greece was. Pesmazoglou was able to win this fight at 
the moment in question and to realise the project without georgiades. it was 
personal trust in a certain person which led to the successful establishment of 
the Privileged company at breathtaking speed. after Pesmazoglou’s premature 
death in 1906, the cooperation between the ba and the foreign bankers became 
more complicated,133 and they pressed for extended possibilities of control 
instead of trust.
University of Duisburg-Essen
133 in 1909, hambro refused to participate in a greek state loan because it was com-
municated by the ba and not by the national bank of greece; see everard hambro to eric 
hambro (29 February 1909), lma ms. 19108.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 01:34:57 |
